The role of intuition in procedural legal hermeneutics

Abstract

The study asserts the relevance of intuition in the interpretive process of law, highlighting a gap in legal practice that disregards intuition as a valid tool. Developed in the context of the course "Legal Hermeneutics and Democratic Principles in the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure" at the State University of Londrina, the research adopts a theoretical and practical analysis, utilizing concepts from Guilherme de Ockham, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Descartes, Luiz Guilherme Marinoni, and Daniel Mitidiero, as well as examples of judicial decisions. The results indicate that intuition is indispensable in the apprehension of the legal phenomenon, preceding its application through deduction or induction. The study concludes that intuition allows for the capture of connotative issues present in law.